Matt Johnson

*Originally published in Political Fiber, July 18, 2012

In the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Kenneth N. Waltz published an article entitled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” In it, he makes one of the most counterintuitive arguments I’ve encountered all year: If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the Middle East will become safer and more stable.

His case rests on a few precarious assumptions and, unsurprisingly, doesn’t deserve to be called “realistic” (Waltz is the father of “neorealism” – one of the most prominent theories in contemporary international relations) in any sense. No matter how hard Mr. Waltz and others continue to try, international relations can’t be reduced to a simple game of weights and counterweights.

Waltz’s first section, titled, “POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED,” discusses three possible outcomes of the Iranian nuclear saga:

1) Sanctions and other forms of international pressure will force Iran to “abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”

2) Iran won’t produce an actual bomb, but will retain a “breakout capability” to develop one.

3) Iran will build and test a nuclear weapon.

Convention wisdom would suggest that the above possibilities get progressively worse as they’re listed. Waltz thinks they get better.

The article argues, “Israel’s proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again.” However, Israel’s enemies may want to consider a more sensible option – one that doesn’t involve international condemnation, debilitating sanctions and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If these countries would stop trying to build the most terrifying weapons on Earth, they would cease to be “potential nuclear rivals” and Israel would have no reason to bomb them. Instead of an obsessive insistence on nuclear weapons and the illegitimacy of Israel, Iran could stop drawing American warships to its borders, become more economically integrated and less of a pariah state.

But Waltz insists, “Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by ‘mad mullahs’ but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders.” Waltz is correct that Iran wouldn’t use a nuclear weapon in a “first strike against Israel,” but that doesn’t make its consistently bellicose, illegal behavior any more rational.

If the only condition for “rationality” is an aversion to suicide, it’s a safe bet that the word isn’t being employed properly. What Iran stands to gain from abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons is immense: A nuclear program deemed legitimate by most of the world, an unencumbered oil industry, less American forces nearby and a general shift in international sentiment.

In another curious assertion, Mr. Waltz fails to note an obvious contradiction, “…If Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself).” So, to “provide for its own security,” Iran is bent on doing the one thing that could subject it to military intervention by the only superpower in the world? As long as we’re talking about rationality, we may want to register the force of this simple observation.

To prove that Iran is merely a typical, self-interested state, Waltz argues, “Iran’s leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January.”

Inconveniently for Mr. Waltz, however, Iran is now issuing that exact same threat in response to increased sanctions on its oil industry. As Iran was conducting a three-day-long missile test in Semnan, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said, “If any form of incident happens, Iran’s ground-to-ground missiles will rain like thunderbolts upon the aggressors.”

One can only wonder what he meant by “any form of incident.” Perhaps an effort to stop Iran from strangling the world’s oil supply would warrant Iranian thunderbolts.

Waltz is brazenly optimistic about the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. In reference to the ongoing India-Pakistan nuclear predicament, he’s strangely complacent, “Since then [1991], even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace.” He continues by advising Israel and Iran to “consider this precedent.”

However, in a 2005 Congressional Research Service report titled “Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons,” Sharon Squassoni was less sanguine about the situation, “Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons capabilities could help provide more conventional stability and that limited nuclear arsenals might dampen competition in missile development. The 1999 conflict in Kargil and 2002 crisis in Kashmir challenged this viewpoint.” Her conclusion was grim:

“South Asia remains a nuclear flashpoint, and, potentially, a source for terrorists of access to weapons of mass destruction.”

What’s overwhelmingly clear in Waltz’s article is a lack of respect for international law. Iran has flagrantly violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as a series of other United Nations resolutions. Important anti-proliferation measures such as the NPT are rendered meaningless if they aren’t enforced. Waltz isn’t just indifferent about Iran’s attempt to shed its international obligations – he can’t wait for it to do so.